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Abstract
Background: Failures and partial successes are common in technology-supported innovation programmes in
health and social care. Complexity theory can help explain why. Phenomena may be simple (straightforward,
predictable, few components), complicated (multiple interacting components or issues) or complex (dynamic,
unpredictable, not easily disaggregated into constituent components). The recently published NASSS framework
applies this taxonomy to explain Non-adoption or Abandonment of technology by individuals and difficulties
achieving Scale-up, Spread and Sustainability. This paper reports the first empirical application of the NASSS
framework.
Methods: Six technology-supported programmes were studied using ethnography and action research for up to
3 years across 20 health and care organisations and 10 national-level bodies. They comprised video outpatient
consultations, GPS tracking technology for cognitive impairment, pendant alarm services, remote biomarker monitoring
for heart failure, care organising software and integrated case management via data warehousing. Data were collected
at three levels: micro (individual technology users), meso (organisational processes and systems) and macro (national
policy and wider context). Data analysis and synthesis were guided by socio-technical theories and organised around
the seven NASSS domains: (1) the condition or illness, (2) the technology, (3) the value proposition, (4) the adopter
system (professional staff, patients and lay carers), (5) the organisation(s), (6) the wider (institutional and societal) system
and (7) interaction and mutual adaptation among all these domains over time.
Results: The study generated more than 400 h of ethnographic observation, 165 semi-structured interviews and 200
documents. The six case studies raised multiple challenges across all seven domains. Complexity was a common feature
of all programmes. In particular, individuals’ health and care needs were often complex and hence unpredictable and ‘off
algorithm’. Programmes in which multiple domains were complicated proved difficult, slow and expensive to implement.
Those in which multiple domains were complex did not become mainstreamed (or, if mainstreamed, did not deliver key
intended outputs).
Conclusion: The NASSS framework helped explain the successes, failures and changing fortunes of this diverse sample
of technology-supported programmes. Since failure is often linked to complexity across multiple NASSS domains, further
research should systematically address ways to reduce complexity and/or manage programme implementation to take
account of it.
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Background
Introduction
Technological innovation is viewed by policymakers as a
driver of both health and wealth [1]. Technology is often
depicted as ’empowering’ for both patients and staff, and
has been associated with improved efficiency, quality and
safety of care [2–5]. In reality, however, technology start-
ups may fail to attract investment [6]; patients may or may
not be able or willing to use new technologies [7]; profes-
sionals may resist them [8–10]; new technologies may clash
with legacy systems and with established routines [11, 12];
a technology may be implemented but fail to deliver the an-
ticipated benefits [13]; and small-scale demonstration pro-
jects may fail to scale up locally, spread distantly or be
sustained over time [14, 15].
In a recently published systematic review, we synthesised
evidence on individual, team, organisational and system in-
fluences on the success of technology-supported innovation
programmes in health and social care [16]. We drew in
particular on published technology implementation frame-
works and key theoretical work on diffusion of innovations
[17, 18], technological entrepreneurship [6, 19], the patient
experience of chronic illness [20], clinician resistance to
technologies [21], the social processes of ‘normalising’
technologies in organisations [22–25], business and finan-
cial planning [14], organisational resilience and sustainabil-
ity [26–28], and theoretical studies on complex adaptive
systems [29, 30].
Our synthesis of this diverse literature occurred in paral-
lel with testing of candidate domains and theories from our
systematic review on a sample of six empirical case studies.
We produced a new multi-level interdisciplinary framework
called NASSS (Non-adoption or Abandonment of technol-
ogy by individuals and difficulties achieving Scale-up,
Spread and Sustainability), which incorporates and extends
the theoretical frameworks and models listed in the previ-
ous paragraph. The NASSS framework is shown diagram-
matically in Panel 1 and Fig. 1.
Panel 1: Domains and questions in the NASSS framework
Domain 1: the condition
1A. What is the nature of the condition or illness?
1B. What are the relevant co-morbidities?
1C. What are the relevant socio-cultural factors?
Domain 2: the technology
2A. What are the key features of the technology?
2B. What kind of knowledge does the technology bring into play?
2C. What knowledge and/or support is required to use the
technology?
2D. What is the technology supply model?
2E. Who owns the intellectual property (IP) generated by the
technology?
Domain 3: the value proposition and value chain
3A. What is the developer’s business case for the technology
(supply-side value)?
3B. What is its desirability, efficacy, safety and cost-effectiveness
(demand-side value)?
Domain 4: the adopter system
(Continued)
4A. What changes in staff roles, practices and identities are
implied?
4B. What is expected of the patient (and/or immediate carer) —
and is this achievable by and acceptable to them?
4C. What is assumed about the extended network of lay carers?
Domain 5: the organisation(s)
5A. What is the organisation’s capacity to innovate?
5B. How ready is the organisation for this technology-supported
change?
5C. How easy will the adoption and funding decision be?
5D. What changes will be needed in team interactions and
routines?
5E. What work is involved in implementation and who will do it?
Domain 6: the wider system
6A. What is the political context for programme development,
implementation and roll-out?
6B. What is the regulatory context?
6C. What is the position of professional bodies?
6D. What is the socio-cultural context (public perception, interest,
expectation)?
6E. What is the nature and extent of inter-organisational
networking?
Domain 7: Embedding and adaptation over time
7A. How much scope is there for adapting and co-evolving the
technology and the service over time?
7B. How resilient is the organisation to handling critical events and
adapting to unforeseen eventualities?
The original questions guiding our empirical research
were the following. (1) How can we improve the process by
which health and care technologies are developed and
implemented? (2) How can we support the customisation
and use of such technologies in the home and/or the health
or care setting? (3) How can we ensure that patients’ needs
and concerns remain central when developing technology-
supported service innovations [31, 32]? The study of com-
plexity was not part of our original proposal, but it quickly
emerged as the dominant theme in our empirical data (as
well as a prominent element in the more recent literature
we were identifying for our systematic review [29, 30]).
Our previous publication focused mainly on the
secondary research component of the NASSS framework
[16]. This paper presents a more detailed account of our
empirical findings and illustrates how the framework
allowed us to explore complexity in multiple interacting
domains.
Complex systems and the NASSS framework
A system is defined as an assembly of agents that interact
with each other. In a simple system (few agents and
components) or a complicated one (many agents and
components), the relationships between agents are well
defined and stable, which means the overall behaviour of
the system is predictable. In contrast, complex, adaptive
systems are composed of agents with ill-defined and
unstable boundaries that may act in unexpected ways,
whose actions are interconnected so that one agent’s
actions change the context for other agents [33]. Hence,
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in complex systems, agents interact with each other and
with other systems in unexpected ways; their component
agents (people, cells, technologies) can simultaneously be
members of several systems. The complex system works
by a fundamentally different logic, since its response to
change is—to a greater or lesser extent—unpredictable
and non-linear [34].
Against this background, the NASSS framework has been
developed to encourage complex thinking (what Tsoukas
calls ‘conjunctive theorising’ [35]) about technological
innovations in healthcare. With a view to generating a rich
narrative of events unfolding in a real-world setting, aspects
of the different domains are first considered in terms of
whether they are simple (straightforward, predictable, few
components—as in making a sandwich), complicated
(remains predictable but there are multiple interacting
components or issues—as in building a rocket) or complex
(dynamic, unpredictable, not easily disaggregated into
constituent components—as in raising a child). Simple and
complicated phenomena operate according to linear,
Newtonian (predictive, cause-and-effect) logic; they can, for
example, be meaningfully analysed in terms of their compo-
nent parts. Complex phenomena operate according to
different (non-linear) logic, in which a given cause may not
always have the same effect. They exhibit broad patterns
and emerge over time, but they are not predictable.
A simple illness or condition (domain 1 in the NASSS
framework) is well characterised, well understood and
predictable (though it may still be serious, e.g. deep
venous thrombosis); its management is straightforward
and is influenced only minimally by co-morbidities or
socio-cultural factors. The same goes for a complicated
condition (e.g. many cancers), though the logistics may
be more challenging. Complex conditions, in contrast,
are poorly characterised, poorly understood, unpredict-
able and/or strongly influenced by co-morbidities and
socio-cultural factors (e.g. drug dependency, dementia).
The complexity dimension in domain 2 (technology) may
refer to the technology’s material (including technical)
properties, its ease of use, the kind of data it generates, its
supply chain or the intellectual property associated with it.
In all these sub-domains, complexity—which is impossible
to define in rigid and universal terms—may relate to
changeability, unpredictability, contestability (e.g. experts
disagree on what the data mean and whether they can be
trusted) and interdependence with other changeable,
unpredictable or contestable aspects (such as availability of
broadband).
The value proposition (domain 3) refers to both supply-
side value (whether there is a straightforward and
uncontested business case for generating revenue for the
developer) and demand-side value (whether there is strong
and uncontested evidence that the technology is desirable
for patients, effective, safe and cost-effective). Complexity
in this domain relates to (for example) multiple and
perhaps interdependent assumptions on which the business
Fig. 1 The NASSS framework for considering influences on the adoption, non-adoption, abandonment, spread, scale-up and sustainability of
health and care technologies. Image adapted from J Med Internet Res. 2017; 19: e367
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case is based, a speculative or contested evidence base for
effectiveness or cost-effectiveness, or gaps in the overall
value chain.
Complexity in relation to intended adopters (domain 4)
does not mean merely that some individuals need to learn
new skills or procedures or adopt new staff roles. More
challenging is the expectation that a staff member, patient
or lay carer will need to take on a different identity (e.g.
data processer, teacher) alongside their traditional one and/
or make judgements that are difficult or unpredictable.
Complexity in the organisational setting (domain 5)
relates in particular to the scope, scale, pace, resource
requirements, and the logistical uncertainties and
interdependencies of delivering the innovation and the
associated new service model [36]. The introduction of a
’disruptive’ technology (that is, one that enables—and
perhaps requires—organisational work to be done
differently [37]) will be complex if known preconditions
for innovation are not met (e.g. if there is weak
leadership, poor managerial relations or severely
stretched resources); if the technology is a poor strategic
‘fit’; if new work routines and/or inter-organisational co-
operation are needed; or if a large amount of work is
needed to build a vision, engage staff, implement the
programme and develop ways of monitoring its impact.
Complexity in the external context (domain 6) means
that there are tricky hurdles to be overcome in relation to
political, financial, legal, regulatory or public concerns, or
that inter-organisational networking and knowledge
sharing are difficult. Again, the key issue is often the inter-
dependency of different influences (which tends to mean
that any one problem cannot be addressed without gener-
ating other problems elsewhere in the system).
Finally, complexity in domain 7 (adaptation over time)
means that further adaptation or co-evolution of the
technology is impossible because of lack of material or
technical flexibility, and/or because the organisation(s)
lack the resilience to adapt to changing external condi-
tions (see Discussion).
Such were the findings of our systematic review that
formed the theoretical basis of the NASSS framework [16].
In the remainder of this paper, we describe the empirical
testing and refining of the NASSS domains across a
maximum-variety sample of technology implementation
case studies. The specific research question addressed in
this paper was: Given that technology programmes in
health and social care are often described as ‘complex’, what
is the nature of this complexity and how might it affect the
fortunes of a programme?
Methods
Context, governance and methodology
The research took place in various field sites across the UK.
It embraced two research programmes: VOCAL (Virtual
Online Consultations—Advantages and Limitations) and
SCALS (Studies in Co-Creating Assisted Living Solutions).
VOCAL (funded from 2015 to 2017, with an earlier set-up
phase from 2011) was an in-depth study of the develop-
ment, introduction and local roll-out of remote (video)
consultations in three contrasting clinical departments,
each on a different geographical site, in a large, multi-site
UK hospital trust [38, 39]. SCALS (funded from 2015 to
2020, with some data collected from 2013) is an action
research study of the challenges faced by UK health and
social care organisations who introduce technology-
supported new service models; it includes examples from
healthcare (e.g. remote biomarker monitoring, video con-
sultations, technologies for integrating care across organisa-
tions) and social care (safety alarms, GPS tracking, care
organising apps) [32].
Both VOCAL and SCALS had an external steering
group with a lay chair and representation from
patients, front-line clinicians, the technology industry
and local and national policymakers (including infor-
mation leads at National Health Service (NHS) Eng-
land). The VOCAL study also had a separate patient
advisory group convened and chaired by a community
anthropologist.
Case studies (all of which were drawn from VOCAL and
SCALS) were sampled by a combination of responsiveness
(health or care organisations sought our input to real-world
implementation challenges), convenience (local initiatives
caught our interest) and theoretical sampling (later cases
were systematically sought to illustrate themes that had
come up in our literature review but were not yet repre-
sented in our sample). The six prospective case studies
reported below have so far been followed for up to 3 years.
Additional, theoretically sampled case studies in the SCALS
programme (added more recently and not reported here)
will be explored in future papers.
Each case study has involved a flexible programme of
qualitative interviews and observation (with patients,
clinicians, managers, technical designers, commercial
partners and—where relevant—investors), analysis of
documents (correspondence, business plans, clinical
records), ethnography (of technology use by patients/
clients and staff, of meetings and events, and of
technology design and functionality) and video-
recording of both ends of remote consultations [31, 32].
In addition, in order to build up a rich picture of the na-
tional context in which technologies evolve, we used a
combination of purposive and snowball sampling to
identify 45 potential stakeholders from across govern-
ment (e.g. NHS England), professional organisations (e.g.
Royal College of Physicians, Medical Protection Society),
patient groups (e.g. National Voices), industry (e.g.
Microsoft) and charitable and third sector organisations
(e.g. Health Foundation). We invited a maximum variety
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sample of 39 of these stakeholders to talk informally
with the study team, of whom we spoke with 36 (the
remaining 3 being uncontactable). We conducted for-
mal semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample
of 12 of these stakeholders (ensuring variation of groups
and perspectives) and combined this with analysis of ap-
proximately 50 key national-level policy and policy-
related documents published since 2000.
Data sources for case studies in VOCAL and SCALS
used for development and testing of the NASSS
framework are summarised in Table 1. The empirical
case studies are outlined briefly below and analysed in
more detail in the Results section.
Outline of the six case studies
Case A (video outpatient consultations) included four
clinical services in the NHS: adult diabetes, antenatal
diabetes and cancer surgery, all using Skype™ [38], and a
community-based, nurse-led heart failure service, using
predominantly FaceTime™. Video consultation was offered
to patients for whom it was judged clinically appropriate
by the clinician. There was strong support from senior
management and many (though not all) clinicians. Almost
all patients volunteering for this option experienced it as
convenient, technically straightforward and able to meet
their clinical needs. But implementation proved logistically
difficult, technically challenging, labour-intensive and
slow. Video consulting was considered not clinically
appropriate for many patients. By the end of the study
period, video consultations had been abandoned in the
antenatal diabetes service and put ‘on hold’ in the
community heart failure service. In the adult diabetes and
cancer surgery services, they continued and were being
extended to other clinical services within the trust.
Case B (global positioning system [GPS] tracking for
people with cognitive impairment) began when the SCALS
team were approached by a local council in a deprived and
multi-ethnic inner city borough and asked to help improve
the take-up of devices to electronically track people with
cognitive impairment who ‘wandered’ outside the home.
We worked with the council and with linked voluntary
sector groups to implement and adapt a selection of devices
and a linked call centre and monitoring service [40, 41].
Whilst several hundred people in the catchment population
had cognitive impairment, only 11 were ever identified as
eligible for GPS tracking and 7 assented (of which only 3
continue to use the technology). Successful adoption of the
technology was found to require a network of extended
family and call centre staff who collectively ‘knew’ the client
and his or her preferred walking route(s).
Case C (pendant alarms): Pendant alarms are worn
around the neck (or on the wrist) and connected to a
remote call centre. The client should press the alarm if he/
she is in difficulty (e.g. fallen and cannot get up); the call
centre will alert either a relative (on a retained contact list)
or an emergency service. Pendant alarm services had been
in widespread use for some years in two participating
organisations in the SCALS study—both urban settings
serving a mixed socio-demographic population. Various
arrangements were in place for referring clients (including
self, GP, social worker and local age charity) and fitting the
alarm (typically a commercial supplier). In both sites,
alarms were widely supplied and often ‘worked’ as intended,
though they depended on a network of carers and profes-
sional staff whose collective knowledge of the client allowed
them to interpret remote signals (e.g. judge whether a call
was an emergency). In many instances, clients did not acti-
vate the alarm when care staff and relatives considered that
they should have done so.
Case D (telehealth for heart failure) was the qualitative
component of a multi-centre randomised controlled trial
of biomarker monitoring (weight, blood pressure, heart
rate) in heart failure (SUPPORT-HF). All participants in
this trial were supplied with a tablet technology through
which they could access their biomarker results, trends
and educational material [42]. The intervention arm in-
cluded active communication of results and recommenda-
tions to the patient’s general practitioner with the aim of
increasing use of recommended medical therapy and
improving patients’ well-being; in the control arm, data
were available for the general practitioner to access if
desired. Across participating sites, clinicians engaged
variably with the study, occasionally leading to slower than
predicted recruitment. Participants’ use of the technology
also varied widely, influenced by various clinical, technical
and logistical issues.
Case E (care organising software) followed the fortunes
of two software products, each designed to help relatives
and friends organise tasks and visits for someone with
health and/or care needs. Product A, a web portal, had
been developed in-house by a small software company.
The business model was to sell the product (at a cost of
several thousand pounds) to care organisations that would
then provide it to their clients free of charge. Product B
was a smartphone app (with linked web portal) that had
been developed via publicly funded R&D using co-design
methodology by a national carers’ charity; it was made
available for individual download (e.g. via the Apple App
Store) for £2.99. By the end of the study, very few families
were using Product A, but around 7500 were registered to
use Product B (a proportion of whom were also receiving
a wider package of support from the care charity).
Case F (shared data warehouse for integrated case
management of patients at risk of hospital admission) was
introduced in 2009 to support a policy of coordinated,
multi-disciplinary case management between health and
social care services through assessment and care planning.
It had been proposed as a solution to the growing
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challenge of emergency hospital admissions in older
people with multiple health and care needs, reflecting
national policy [43]. The cross-organisation data ware-
house incorporating a predictive risk modelling tool was
intended to automate the identification and stratification
of people at high risk of hospital admission, and enable
shared access to care plans, thus facilitating coordinated
action and frequent dialogue between primary and
secondary care providers and social services. However, the
original vision of ‘integrated care’ achieved through the
technology was only partially realised because, in practice,
high-risk patients were identified and managed through a
Table 1 Summary of empirical case studies and data sources (adapted from J Med Internet Res. 2017; 19: e367)
Study site(s) Technology/ies Participants Data sources
Case A. Video outpatient consultations
A1: Acute hospital trust
(3 specialties — diabetes,
antenatal, cancer — on
different sites)
A2: Nurse-led heart failure
service run from
community hospital
Skype™ (acute hospital) and
FaceTime™ (community hospital)
together with commercially
available blood pressure and
heart rate monitors, weighing
scales and oximeter
A1: 24 staff (9 clinicians, 10 support
staff, 5 managers); 27 patients
A2: 10 staff (8 nurses, one manager,
one administrator); 8 patients
Plus 48 national stakeholders and
wider informants on remote
consulting
35 formal semi-structured interviews
plus ~ 100 informal interviews;
150+ hours of ethnographic observation;
40 videotaped remote consultations
(12 diabetes, 6 antenatal diabetes,
12 cancer, 10 heart failure); 500+ emails;
30 local documents, e.g. business plans,
protocols; 50 national-level documents
Case B. GPS tracking for cognitive impairment
Social care organisation in
deprived borough in inner
London
GPS tracking devices supplied by
5 different technology companies,
includes GPS tracking with virtual
map and ‘geo-fence’ alert functions
7 index cases; 8 lay carers;
5 formal carers, 3 social care staff;
3 healthcare staff; 3 call centre staff
22 ethnographic visits and ‘go-along’
interviews with index cases (~ 50 h);
15 ethnographic visits with health
and social care staff; 6 staff interviews;
5 team meetings; 3 local protocols
Case C. Pendant alarms
C1: Healthcare
commissioning
organisation in deprived
borough in outer London
C2: Social care organisation
in mixed borough in
the Midlands
In both sites, pendant alarms
and base units were supplied
by multiple different technology
companies and supported
by local councils, each with a
different set of arrangements
with providers and an
‘arms-length management
organisation’ alarm support
service
C1: 8 index cases; 7 lay carers;
12 professional staff
C2: 11 index cases; 9 health/social
care staff from frontline service
delivery to senior board level;
3 representatives from telecare
industry
50 semi-structured and narrative
interviews; 61 ethnographic visits
(~ 80 h of observation) including
needs assessments and reviews;
20 h of observation at team meetings
Case D. Remote biomarker monitoring in heart failure
Acute hospital trusts in
six different cities in UK
Tablet computer and Bluetooth-
enabled commercially available
sensing devices (blood pressure
and heart rate monitor,
weighing scales)
7 research staff including principal
investigator and research coordinator
for SUPPORT-HF trial; 7 clinical staff
involved in trial; 4 clinical staff not
involved in trial; (to date) 18 patient
participants and one spouse
1 patient focus group; 8 patient
interviews; 24 additional
semi-structured interviews;
SUPPORT-HF study protocol
and ethics paperwork; material
properties and functionality of
biomarker database
Case E. Care organising software
E1: Healthcare
commissioning
organisation in
northern England
E2: National carer support
charity in UK
Product A: Web-based
portal developed by small
tech company for use
by families to help them
organise and coordinate
the care of (typically) an
older relative
Product B: Smartphone
app co-designed by
carer support charity
for same purpose
Product A: 2 technology
developers and CEO of
technology company; 4
social care commissioners;
30 health and social care
staff considering using
the device; 4 users of the
device, one non-user
Product B (to date):
2 members of care
charity (including CEO);
10 qualitative case studies
of users undertaken
by another academic team
22 semi-structured and narrative
interviews; 16 h ethnographic
observations of meetings;
auto-ethnographic testing
of functionality and usability
of devices; secondary analysis
of 3rd party evaluation of
Product B
Case F. Data warehouse for integrated case management
1 acute hospital trust,
1 community health trust,
3 local councils, 3 healthcare
commissioning organisations
Integrated data warehouse
incorporating predictive risk
modelling (in theory
interoperable with record
systems in participating
organisations)
14 staff; 20 patient participants 14 semi-structured interviews;
50 ethnographic visits (~ 80 h);
12 h shadowing community staff;
4 h observation of interdisciplinary
meetings; 12 local protocols/
documents
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combination of risk stratification and data entry (using the
technology) and clinical judgement and dialogue (bypass-
ing the technology).
Data analysis and testing of the NASSS framework
We sought to analyse our six case studies both individually
[44] and also as a theoretically sampled collection of cases
representing maximum diversity in each of the NASSS
domains [45]. This work both informed, and was informed
by, our ongoing systematic review [16]. For example, the
addition of domain 1 to the NASSS framework was
prompted by a strong theme in our empirical data that
non-adoption and abandonment of technologies were often
explained by heterogeneity and unpredictability in the pa-
tient’s illness, co-morbidities and socio-cultural background.
The addition of Case F (data warehouse) was prompted by
the discovery from our secondary research that technologies
intended for sharing data between organisations raised
unique logistical, technical and professional challenges.
For each of the six case studies, we analysed qualitative
data thematically and produced an initial narrative
summary. We wove in quantitative data (e.g. uptake and
usage rates) as part of that narrative and used longitudinal
methods (e.g. repeat interviews, data trends) to build the
narrative over time. We held a series of meetings
(approximately monthly) to discuss each of the NASSS
domains, singly and in combination, as they pertained to
each case study—and tested emerging theory against these
domains. Our refinement of the NASSS framework, and
in particular the generation of key sub-questions within
each domain, owed much to these cross-case meetings.
Results
Below, we apply the different domains of the NASSS
framework to our case studies before considering (in the
Discussion) the implications of our findings in terms of
complexity theory. We have presented Case A (video
outpatient consultations) in depth and added additional
data from other case studies where they add to the
granularity of the analysis.
Domain 1: the condition
Differences in the underlying illness largely explained
differences in the fortunes of the video consultation
option in the four services studied in Case A. Routine
check-ups for adults with diabetes and follow-up consul-
tations after cancer surgery were mostly consistent and
predictable (i.e. simple), and most unpredictable eventu-
alities were of low risk. By the end of the study period,
approximately 20% of all consultations in these clinics
were being conducted by video.
In contrast, diabetes in pregnancy was an example of a
complex condition. In pregnancy, diabetes tends to be
metabolically volatile and if poorly controlled may lead to
foetal abnormalities or death. Many pregnant women had
developed diabetes only since becoming pregnant, and so
were novices in self-administering insulin. The lead phys-
ician felt strongly accountable to the unborn child, and so
only offered the video option to patients (3% of the total)
judged to be ‘low risk’ (for example, those with high health
literacy, good technological skills and fluency in English).
Heart failure is a serious, unpredictable and often
unstable (hence, complex) illness whose effects vary from
patient to patient and in the same patient over time [46].
It is mostly a condition of older people and occurs
disproportionately in lower socio-economic groups. One
of its common side effects is profound tiredness, and it is
almost always associated with other co-morbidities
(notably kidney disease, diabetes, depression or cognitive
impairment). Heart failure nurses in our study made
judgements about the stability or otherwise of the illness
and about patients’ co-morbidities (including cognitive
ability and mental health status), health and technological
literacy, family support and technical set-up at home and
motivation. As a result, the video consultation option was
deemed inappropriate for many (at the time of writing,
fewer than 20 such consultations had been undertaken
across a clinic population of several hundred).
Complexity in the underlying condition was also
associated with non-adoption, abandonment or limited
usefulness of technologies in Cases B and C (in which
dementia or multi-morbidity respectively made the pa-
tient unable or unwilling to use the supplied technology)
and Case F (in which the predictive risk modelling tool
selected multi-morbidity as a risk factor for hospital
admission, but few such patients proved to be ‘textbook
cases’ to manage).
Domain 2: the technology
The technologies used for video consultations, Skype™ and
FaceTime™, are both mass-market software packages from
large multi-national companies, presenting low risk of
supplier withdrawal and relatively straightforward substitut-
ability (hence, in these respects they could be classified as
simple or complicated). However, there were elements of
complexity. For example, they were run from NHS hard-
ware (sometimes many years old) and from patient-held
laptops, tablets or smartphones of varying quality and
dependability. The software was sometimes logistically diffi-
cult to install on NHS computers (e.g. because of limited
capacity of the IT support team and maintain ‘non-stand-
ard’ software environments), and even when installed, it
was not 100% dependable for both technical (machine
‘crashing’) and human error (e.g. forgotten password) rea-
sons. Workarounds tended to use low-tech, dependable so-
lutions (e.g. community heart failure nurses defaulted to
telephone consultations when video connection failed), thus
reducing complexity.
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Whilst video transmits speech and visual cues reasonably
well (although variations in audio and video quality are
quite common), clinical examination sometimes needs
other modalities. In heart failure care, for example, the
physical examination (e.g. blood pressure, heart rhythm, leg
oedema) that the nurses considered essential was not easy
in the remote environment—though it was sometimes
possible with patient and carer assistance when the nurse
knew the patient well. There was no easy or automated way
of sharing and recording patient-held data such as home
blood pressure readings (patients typically read out num-
bers but some misinterpreted the digital display or viewed
it upside down).
The other case studies illustrated different aspects of
complexity in the technology. GPS tracking technology
(Case B), pendant alarms (Case C) and care organising
software (Case E) all relied on bespoke solutions from small
and medium-sized enterprise (SME) companies, and hence
were vulnerable to withdrawal; these companies sometimes
lacked capacity to meet the bureaucratic requirements for
potential spread and scale-up. Case D used software that
had been developed as part of an academic research study;
importantly, the research nurse and technical team were
co-located, allowing minor (but potentially critical) tech-
nical issues to be resolved in an ongoing way. Case F fea-
tured bespoke software supplied through a longstanding
relationship with an SME that was subsequently acquired
by a global company. These technologies all required con-
siderable knowledge and skill to use to their full potential.
An assumption underpinning the design of patient-held
assistive technologies was that a group of relatives and/or
friends would exist, live locally, be technology-savvy and
be able and willing to collaborate around the care of the
index case. In fact, such networks were rarely pre-existing;
they often had to be built and nurtured. Cases B, C and D
highlighted the role of both lay carers and professional
staff in helping to set up and ‘service’ the technology and
keep it in working order, a role that could be particularly
onerous if the technology (as in case B) was not
dependable.
The data warehouse for integrated case management in
Case F was well embedded organisationally (in the sense
that it was enshrined in national policy and local sub-
contracts and data sharing agreements, and staff
were employed to work on it). But it was not technically
well embedded in the sense of seamless interoperability of
data between participating organisations; significant work-
arounds were required to (for example) share care plans.
The predictive risk modelling tool generated a different
kind of risk estimate than a home visit from a clinician or
social worker who knew the individual well and who had
the capacity and authority to bear witness to a narrative
and make contextual judgements. Our data illustrated that
often neither approach alone offered the full picture that
was sometimes necessary for making judgements. Thus, the
output (risk score) generated by the technology was com-
plex (in the sense that it was incomplete and contested).
Domain 3: the value proposition and overall value chain
The supply-side value proposition for video consulting in
Case A currently appears complex. The multi-national
companies behind Skype™ and FaceTime™ are also devel-
oping multiple other health products, especially directed
towards the expanding ‘wellness and wearables’ market.
From a purely financial perspective, such direct-to-
consumer products may offer a more lucrative supply-side
value proposition than investing in a major business ven-
ture to support video consultation products and services
in the NHS, because working through technical and infor-
mation governance challenges is a resource-intensive and
time-consuming process with no guarantee of meeting
shareholder or executive expectations at the end of it. Our
interviews also suggest that companies are aware of the
potential for reputational risk associated with seeking to
profit from virtual consultations in the NHS.
The demand-side value (to patients) of video consulta-
tions is also complex, since the evidence base on which it
rests is currently sparse. Whilst around 20 randomised
controlled trials in a range of conditions have demon-
strated equivalent efficacy and safety between video and
face-to-face consultations [38], the samples for these trials
are likely to have been carefully selected. Members of our
VOCAL patient advisory group raised concerns about the
risk of a ‘two-tier’ service in which demand-side value for
a minority of patients will be gained at the expense of
service cuts for the majority—a concern which, though
speculative, has recently been echoed by professional
bodies, clinicians and patients [47, 48].
In Case D, one aspect of the value proposition (which
affects both supply- and demand-side value) is the potential
of the data collected to inform the development of predict-
ive algorithms based on biomarker changes over time and
hence predict and pre-empt decompensation, hence avert-
ing hospital admission (rather than just prompting medica-
tion changes on the basis of, say, a rise or fall in blood
pressure). This option creates new possibilities for ‘persona-
lised’ medicine, but it also increases complexity. Whilst
real-world value is hard to assess in the context of a
randomised controlled trial, we note that the promise (or
aspiration) of the telehealth package in Case D is highly
complex, since it seeks to achieve multiple goals, including:
(1) improving heart failure management in the community;
(2) reducing demand on services (by allowing nurses to
take on higher case loads); (3) preventing unplanned admis-
sions; and (4) developing further predictive capabilities.
Case E illustrates two very different business models (and
technology development models) for similar technologies
and use cases. In one (Product A), the value proposition
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was highly speculative and little attempt was made to work
with intended end-users to increase the technology’s fitness
for purpose (and hence its desirability) during development.
The implicit assumption was that the technology would be
more or less plug-and-play; the business model rested on
provider organisations paying for a block contract even
though the intended benefits (and/or savings elsewhere in
the system) were not clear. Product B included substantial
up-front investment (from publicly funded R&D) to under-
take co-design work; it was explicitly developed by a charity
as a ‘public good’ in which costs to end-users would be
minimal and viewed as a component of a wider (and
ongoing) charity-supported package. These projects are
both ongoing, but at the time of writing we would classify
Product A’s value proposition as complex and Product B’s
as complicated.
Domain 4: the adopter system
In the adoption of video consulting (Case A), there was
considerable complexity in the adopter system. There was,
for example, a striking difference between innovators
(who embraced the new technology and way of working
with enthusiasm) and other clinicians on the same teams
who were reluctant to change, reflecting previous research
showing that staff resistance is the single most important
reason given for low uptake of remote health care [10, 49].
The hurdle was not merely learning to use a new
technology but also accepting changes in identity (e.g.
some staff did not view themselves as ‘techy’) and role
(e.g. helping a remote patient troubleshoot technical
problems with Skype™ or FaceTime™), dealing with
perceptions of overload when running a new virtual
service in parallel with a traditional face-to-face one and
feeling under pressure to realise efficiency gains before the
system had been fully redesigned to maximise such gains.
New staff roles were not restricted to clinicians directly
using the video technology; receptionists, clerks and
technicians all had to accommodate new roles that the
technology required in order to ‘work’. The same was true
of the patient, who could sometimes but not always seek
technical help from family members.
The other case studies illustrated additional complexities
in the adopter system, such as some staff expressing
ethical reservations about ‘tagging’ clients (Case B) or
clinical concerns about the data generated by the
technology (Case D—some clinicians were worried about
possible legal liability if telehealth data, generated
elsewhere and impossible to verify directly, were later
found to be flawed). In Case C, clients sometimes rejected
a pendant alarm because it symbolised dependence or
because they were unwilling to pay a small monthly
connection fee or be placed in a dependency relationship
with a relative or neighbour.
Domain 5: the organisation(s)
The hospital trust that hosted the VOCAL study had
strong leadership and good managerial relations; it met key
criteria for technological innovativeness (e.g. it had
previously won a national ‘Digital Trust of the Year’ award),
and there was board-level enthusiasm for the introduction
of video consultations. Despite these encouraging precondi-
tions (‘simple’ in our taxonomy), other features of the
organisation were highly complex. In particular, it had very
limited spare staff time and resources (e.g. key posts were
unfilled, and many clinic terminals were running outdated
versions of software packages)—a problem known as ‘lack
of organisational slack’ [18]. In addition, whilst many senior
decision-makers assumed that the new service would save
money by making services more efficient, the question of
whether a video consultation would actually cost less to
deliver was not easy to answer because of potential knock-
ons in the system (e.g. the need for additional IT support
and staff training; the fact that rooms still needed to be
occupied, records retrieved and appointments booked even
when the consultation was virtual; and the theoretical
possibility of an increase in appointments as clinicians and
patients found it easier to connect).
Another feature of complexity was that whilst video
consultations between clinicians and selected patients
usually worked well, the linked routines for booking
appointments, managing the clinic list (e.g. registering
when each patient had ‘arrived’ and ‘left’) and organising
follow-up did not mesh well with a system that had
evolved to process patients using their physical presence
(waiting in line at a reception desk), manual transfer of
paper records between different plastic ‘bins’ and sticky
notes. Alignment with such routines was initially achieved
using workarounds; by the end of the study, new
(computer-based) routines had been developed by some
but not all participating teams. Whilst Skype functionality
increased access (by, for example, allowing patients to
send messages to the clinician’s Skype account), and whilst
this ease of access was sometimes clinically appropriate
and encouraged (e.g. “drop me a message to confirm the
change of insulin dose was OK”), it generated complexities
elsewhere in the system, since the clinician then had to
log the message on the medical record.
Similar complexity-related challenges were evident in
the community heart failure study. The community trust
was a digital innovator and had supplied all nurses with
tablet computers to help them with various aspects of
their work. Again, whilst video consultations worked well
clinically for selected patients, at the time of writing they
were not well integrated logistically with the administra-
tive aspects of the service. There was no formal opposition
from top management in the community trust to the
nurse-led video consultation service. But neither was there
strong enthusiasm, and there was limited spare capacity
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among front-line teams to undertake the work of making
sense of the new approach, enrolling and training staff be-
yond initial enthusiasts, implementing new work routines
and evaluating the service.
In our other case studies, enthusiasm at board level was
sometimes absent (e.g. because business cases were weak)
and/or key opponents were strategically placed and had
high wrecking power (specific examples withheld). In
Case D, wide variability in clinician engagement among
the different study sites could be explained largely in
terms of the extent to which the local team shared a
vision for how remote biomarker monitoring for heart
failure might enhance rather than threaten the existing
service, an aspect of implementation work that May calls
‘coherence work’ [22].
In Case F, establishing integrated case management
through shared data and predictive risk modelling
technology was extremely complex because multiple
organisations needed to be involved; the establishment
and development of the programme unfolded over
several years and relied on partnership working and
contracting arrangements at different levels of multiple
organisations. The technology was implemented, but the
anticipated reduction in costs from reducing hospital
admissions were not realised as real savings because of
the complexities of reimbursement mechanisms and
because case management was not always successful in
avoiding admissions.
Domain 6: the wider system
The most significant system-level challenge to the scale-
up and spread of video consultations in Case A was that
there was no established national tariff for funding such
consultations. In the VOCAL study, the local commis-
sioning organisation proposed reimbursing such consul-
tations at a rate (‘pass through tariff ’ [50]) intermediate
between a telephone consultation and a face-to-face one.
But even though members of the relevant national
policymaking team were on the study steering group
and there was no opposition ’in principle’ to establishing
a national tariff, this had still not been achieved at the
time of writing—mainly because data to inform costing
calculations were difficult to obtain and contested by
some parties. This is a good example of how innovative,
technology-supported service models can succeed as
demonstration projects through local workarounds but
will fail to spread or be sustained unless the regulatory
and financial context is supportive [51]. Another con-
textual factor which added complexity in case study A
was a mixed reaction from professional bodies, whose
enthusiasm for new, potentially more efficient, models
of care was tempered by concerns about workload and
threats to equity.
Our national-level stakeholder interviews revealed an-
other aspect of complexity relating to the nature and
strength of evidence expected by different stakeholder
groups. The technology industry typically moves quickly,
with a development model based on rapid iterations of
technologies and a pragmatic understanding of what
works in practice (the ‘fail early, fail often’ principle).
Policymakers, in contrast, tend to want what they call
‘gold standard’ evidence (for example, from randomised
controlled trials) to ‘prove’ that a particular technology
has the impacts claimed. This mismatch appeared to
explain some of the slow progress on national-level
policy in relation to video consultations.
The acute trust where our video consultation study was
based was one of the first public sector providers in the
UK to introduce this service model [39]. In the last year of
the VOCAL study, more than 50 organisations contacted
the lead clinician seeking advice or asking to visit to see
the video consultation service in action. This is an
example of the important role of inter-organisational
networking in supporting the exchange of both explicit
and tacit knowledge [18].
Domain 7: adaptation over time
The video consulting services in Case A illustrated both
resistance to adaptation (through material limitations and
institutionalised information governance regulations) and
adaptiveness (through clinicians’ creative and responsive
use of the technology). The NHS has a ‘locked-down’
computer environment in which any new hardware or
software must be carefully considered and formally
approved before being installed or upgraded (a
characteristic that reduces complexity for IT managers but
tends to increase complexity for front-line staff). Rapidly
evolving software sits awkwardly in such an environment.
In the VOCAL study, an automated upgrade to Skype™
made the system non-functional on clinical terminals until
re-authorised by someone with administrator-level access
rights—a problem that resulted in some remote clinics hav-
ing to be done by telephone.
The material features of Skype™ enabled the development
of ‘ad hoc’ consulting in the young adult diabetes clinic, for
example, when the patient saw that the clinician was online
and sent a text (SMS) message asking a question about a
recently changed insulin dosage. The clinician could either
reply by SMS message (within Skype™) or offer a real-time
video consultation (typically very short). This adaptive use
of video technology for patient-initiated consultations was
viewed by clinicians as a game-changer for ‘challenging’ pa-
tients (characterised by high non-attendance rate at clinic,
poor glycaemic control and a history of hospital admission
for diabetic emergencies).
Several other cases in our dataset illustrated a similar
tension between system rigidity (for contractual or cost
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reasons) and adaptation (through user creativity). In
Case C, for example, potentially remediable problems
occurred with some alarms, but adaptation was
impossible because of the risk of loss of warranty. A
pendant alarm service initially introduced to provide
emergency physical support (e.g. for falls) was adapted
over time to provide non-emergency emotional support
for certain older people, who were encouraged by call
centre staff to press the alarm button to trigger a
supportive conversation when feeling lonely.
In Case F, following the introduction of the integrated
case management data warehouse technology, clinical and
administrative staff across different organisations collectively
learnt and redefined what this technology could and could
not do. They amended, adapted and worked around it. For
example, clinicians and practitioners reviewed the outputs
of the data-driven risk stratification model but also supple-
mented them with other data and used their judgement to
target additional patients who had not been flagged as ‘high
risk’ by the technological algorithm. Technical developers
continually updated the user interface through an ongoing
relationship with the procuring body. Notwithstanding these
efforts, there was a brittleness about the technology (and the
work routines it presupposed) that staff experienced as per-
sistently frustrating. Thus, there was a sense that the tech-
nology had been ’successfully’ implemented and was for the
moment being sustained (because it met policy expecta-
tions), but was not truly fit for purpose.
Discussion
Through in-depth, longitudinal ethnography across a
maximum-variety sample of local technology-supported
innovations, along with an analysis of national context, we
have shown that failures, partial successes and unantici-
pated problems are common. Using the NASSS framework,
these outcomes can be explained by complexity across
multiple, interacting domains. Technology-supported
innovation programmes face particular challenges when:
 The condition or illness is complex because
it is poorly characterised, poorly understood,
unpredictable in its natural history or associated
with multiple co-morbidities or socio-cultural
concerns (such as poverty, low health literacy
or particular beliefs or traditions).
 The technology creates additional complexity
because it has multiple interacting components,
requires close embedding within already-complex
technical systems, lacks dependability, provides an
unreliable, incomplete or contested picture of the
condition, requires advanced knowledge to use it
or exists only as a bespoke solution that is vulnerable
to supplier withdrawal.
 The supply-side value proposition rests on an
underdeveloped, implausible or risky business case
(hence, is unlikely to attract investment), or the
demand-side value proposition suggests that (from
the patient’s perspective) the technology could be
undesirable, unsafe, ineffective or unaffordable.
 The adopter system is complex because the
innovation does not merely require staff to take
on new roles but also puts staff under pressure,
threatens their professional identity, values or
scope of practice, or poses a risk of job loss; because
it requires patients to undertake complex tasks such
as initiate changes in therapy or make judgements
about what is an emergency; or because it
presupposes a network of carers who are willing
and able to coordinate their input.
 The organisation(s) is/are complex as a result
of severe resource pressures (e.g. frozen posts),
weak leadership and managerial relations and a
climate in which creativity and risk-taking are
punished; and in situations where, in relation to
this particular technology, there is minimal tension
for change, poor innovation-system fit and multiple
opponents to the programme, some of whom are
strategically placed and have wrecking power.
Complexity will loom large when new team routines
or care pathways predicated on the new technology
conflict with established ones, and when significant
work is needed to build shared vision, engage staff,
enact new practices, monitor impact and support
ongoing adaptation. It will be a prominent feature
of a programme spanning multiple organisations
who have no formal links and/or have conflicting
agendas, where funding depends on cost savings
across the system, where the costs and benefits to
each partner organisation are unclear, and where
new infrastructure for the proposed programme
conflicts with existing infrastructure and where
there are significant budget implications.
 The wider system is complex because policy
changes that the new service model requires raise
tricky political, regulatory, legal, financial or other
challenges, because policymakers and industry
have different views on what counts as high-quality
evidence, because professional bodies and lay
stakeholders are currently unsupportive or opposed
or because there are barriers to inter-organisational
networking and knowledge-sharing.
 The time dimension is complex because further
adaptation and/or co-evolution of the technology
or service is impossible (or only possibly to a
limited extent), or because sense-making, collective
reflection and adaptive action are discouraged
in a rigid, inflexible implementation model.
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As the case narratives above illustrate, when there is
complexity across multiple domains (and this occurs
commonly), outcomes become even less predictable, less
controllable and (hence) less amenable to conventional
planning and implementation logic.
Despite abundant evidence of complexity in multiple
domains in all our case studies, our data indicated a
tendency of planners, policymakers and technology
designers to assume that the issues to be addressed were
merely complicated (hence, knowable, predictable and
controllable) rather than complex (that is, inherently not
knowable or predictable but dynamic and emergent). What
might be called ‘complexity work’ (adaptation and
adjustment to accommodate a host of emergent issues) was
absent from policymakers’ version of the project but loomed
large in the day-to-day experience of front-line staff.
A complicated programme can be managed rationally
by careful planning, implementation of agreed procedures
and monitoring. Typically, such programmes are divided
into discrete work packages (perhaps ’work-as-imagined’
packages [52]), each of which can be defined, assigned a
leader, undertaken and reported on separately from other
work packages. A focus on complicatedness rather than
complexity is illustrated, for example, by the digital
maturity assessment tools produced by NHS England [53].
The ’de facto standard in UK government’ for managing
complicated programmes, underpinned by a logic model,
is PRINCE2 (PRojects IN Controlled Environments) [54].
PRINCE2 and similar tools focus almost exclusively on an
abstracted depiction of process (what needs to be done, by
whom and by when).
A complex programme, especially one that is designed
around clinical or social care of sick or vulnerable people,
requires a very different approach. Its management must
attend carefully to people, motivations, values and
professional norms, and put mechanisms in place to detect
deviations from expected outcomes, identify the numerous
contributory causes and make timely adjustments by
adapting technologies, practices and workflows. This is partly
about a different, more flexible, iterative and user-centred
approach to programme management (which some have
termed ‘co-realisation’ [55]), partly about a central focus on
the people involved, including the deeply held professional
identities, norms and values that underpin so-called resistance
to new technologies [21] and the need for organisational
members to make sense of technology-supported change in
an ongoing, evolving way [23], and partly about the import-
ance of organisaton and system learning to ensure that what
has been learnt during deployment can be captured and re-
used to inform strategies for subsequent scaling up and sus-
tainability [56].
The uncertainty of outcomes in complex programmes
means that they are highly likely to witness active
experimentation by users as they grapple with the
challenges of discovering the capabilities and limitations
of a new technology. These experiments might involve
reconfiguring the technologies, processes or both.
Hence, the phase within a programme that is commonly
referred to as ‘deployment’ needs to be viewed not as its
final denouement but as an opportunity for learning,
refinement and adaptation. The key to achieving this is
the use of a variety of modes of communication, both
among programme team members and between the
programme team and the users [57].
It is encouraging that some recognition of the need
for technology ‘deployment’ to be iterative, adaptive,
people-focused and oriented to social learning is
evident in some recent initiatives in healthcare. For
example, the NHS Technology Adoption Centre
(NTAC), which is part of the UK’s National Institute
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), provides
innovation process guides that are designed to cap-
ture and distill the experiences of early adopters [58].
However, NTAC’s primary focus is on tackling organ-
isational issues such as stakeholder recruitment and
business case development, rather than, for example,
supporting the day-to-day work of monitoring, com-
municating, evaluating and adapting.
Conclusion
This first empirical application of the NASSS framework
has illustrated how complexity characterises multiple
dimensions of many technology-supported change pro-
grammes. In every case study, the mismatch between work-
as-imagined and work-as-done was substantial. Illnesses
behaved idiosyncratically, not as depicted in textbooks.
Technologies showed promise (including potential value
for developers and patients) but also both symbolic and
material fickleness. Human agents (staff, patients, technol-
ogy developers, policymakers) brought their values,
motives, capabilities and beliefs to bear on their assessment
of local situations, and this affected their resulting action
(or inaction), which then had knock-ons across the system.
The organisational and wider setting for introducing,
implementing and monitoring technologies was charac-
terised by both opportunities and constraints that were
multiple and changing. Creative, adaptive solutions and
workarounds sometimes but not always helped keep the
show on the road.
We conclude that a rationalist approach to implementing
technology programmes, based on abstracted principles for
managing complicatedness in linear and static deployment
models, is unlikely to lead to the large-scale ‘disruptive
innovation’ that policymakers have envisaged, nor will it
address the specific challenges of local scale-up, distant
spread and long-term sustainability. As Ludwig Wittgen-
stein commented in ‘Philosophical Investigations’,
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We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction
and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but
also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We
want to walk, so we need friction. Back to the rough
ground! [59].
Our data suggest that it is towards this ‘rough ground’ of
real-world implementation, collective sensemaking and
social learning at the front line that attention should now
be turned. Until recently, researchers trod tentatively if at
all on such ground, but the shift to complexity thinking in
the business and management literature has begun to gen-
erate principles, tools and practical approaches that are (at
least to some extent) evidence-based.
Whilst we originally developed the NASSS framework to
support academic activity (e.g. ‘conjunctive theorising’ [35]
to illuminate and explain our case studies), we have begun
to use the framework in more practical ways to try to
increase the success of complex programmes in health and
social care. Relevant to this practical application (which is
currently in its early stages) is the work of Janssen et al. on
technology-driven transformation [60]. These authors ac-
knowledge that complexity theory eschews universal solu-
tions and predictive models but maintain that there are
nevertheless some core principles of non-linear system
change that will increase the chances of programme success.
Adapting these suggestions and taking account of the
findings presented here, we propose the following principles
for technology adopters, commissioners and policymakers:
(1) assess the nature and extent of complexity in the
programme and ensure that emergent and adaptive
measures are used to address these issues; (2) establish
overall leadership (since complex programmes often suffer
from outsourcing of control and coordination); (3) craft and
sustain a vision (ensure that key players understand and
share a sense of why the project is important); (4) create
incentives (but leave front-line staff to work out how to de-
liver); (5) respond adaptively as the programme-in-context
evolves (for example, by collecting and reflecting on emer-
ging data and harnessing human creativity); (6) control
growth (since projects that evolve organically are vulnerable
to over-ambitious extension and scope creep); (7) create
slack (to resource adaptive responses); and (8) manage the
tension between innovation and implementation, especially
when continuing evolution of the technology (e.g. additional
functionality) adds to complexity.
Our empirical findings also suggest that it will often be
mission-critical to reduce complexity in as many domains
and sub-domains as possible. Maylor et al., focusing mainly
on commercial projects, recently developed a complexity as-
sessment tool intended to be used prospectively to identify,
understand, reduce and/or ‘run with’ the different aspects of
complexity in a technology project or programme [36].
We are currently in the process of using the NASSS
framework to adapt this tool to support a systematic
approach to complexity reduction in the very different
context of health and social care.
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